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Why no Cohabitation in Taiwan?
An analysis of Taiwan’s Constitution and its application
Da-Chi Liao et Herlin Chien
1 After the Sixth Legislative Yuan election on December 11th 2004,  Taiwan’s  political
arena  was,  once  again,  resounding  with  the  debate  on  adopting  French-style
cohabitation1. The revision of the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1997 2
gave  the  ROC  President  the  power  to  appoint  the  Premier  of  the  Executive  Yuan
without  the  consent  of  the  Parliament.  Thus  the  Taiwan  political  system,
constitutionally speaking, resembles more the French semi-presidential system in the
Fifth  Republic,  than  the  US-style  presidential  system.  However,  despite  this  strong
resemblance,  the  systems  are  distinct.  While  France  has  experienced  three
cohabitations—in 1986, 1993 and 1997—, how is that Taiwan has not taken the same
route? Does the ROC Constitution require cohabitation when the President has lost
majority support in Parliament? What has prevented cohabitation since President Chen
Shui-bian’s election in 20003? 
Constitutional framework
2 In general, there is consensus among scholars that Taiwan’s political system resembles
the dual-executive or what Maurice Duverger termed the semi-presidential system of
the Fifth Republic in France4.  Duverger defines three conditions for a constitutional
system to be termed “semi-presidential” 5: the President is directly elected for a fixed
term; the President possesses quite considerable powers; and, the Constitution grants
both the head of  state—the President—and the head of  the government—the Prime
Minister—to share executive power6. France, after its 1962 Constitutional reform, which
created a directly elected President by a popular vote, and Taiwan, with its Constitution
amended  in  1997,  which  authorises  the  direct  nomination  of  the  Premier  by  the
President without the consent of the Parliament, meet the first two of Duverger’s three
conditions7.
3 However,  the  political  systems  of France  and  Taiwan  have,  crucially,  different
constitutional requirements, in addition to the fact that the relationship between the
executive and the legislature varies one from the other.  The French Constitution is
designed in such a way as to facilitate the emergence of cohabitation if the President
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does  not  have  majority  support  in  Parliament;  whereas  Taiwan’s  constitutional
framework does not, whether the President has the support of the Parliament or not. 
4 Articles 53 and 57 of the ROC Constitution state respectively that “the Executive Yuan
shall be the highest administrative organ of the state” and “the Executive Yuan shall be
responsible to the Legislative Yuan”. Article 20 of the Fifth Republic Constitution of
France,  meanwhile,  states  that  “the  government  determines  and  executes  national
policies. The government dictates administrative institutions and the use of the army.
The government, under articles 49 and 50, is responsible for the Parliament”. Later,
Article 21 authorises the Prime Minister to direct actions of government. As such, by
the  legal  framework,  the  executive  branches  in  France  and  Taiwan  ought  to  be
responsible for the legislative branches.
5 In parallel, Presidents in Taiwan and the French Fifth Republic are given constitutional
power to nominate the Prime Minister who is  the head of  the Executive branch of
government. However, while a presidential order in Taiwan can actively remove the
Premier from office without the countersignature of the Premier8, the President in the
Fifth Republic only can passively grant the resignation of the Prime Minister along with
dismissal of the government9. Legally then, in the event of a divided government where
the President and the majority in Parliament are with different parties, the nominated
French  Prime  Minister  only  needs  to  earn  the  support  of  the  Parliament,  once
appointed, as the trust of the President is irrelevant due to the president having no
active power of dismissal over the Premier. While the Premier in Taiwan must have the
support of the President, as the power to dismiss the Premier remains in the hands of
the President.
6 Article  49  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Fifth  Republic  has  no  parallel  in  the  ROC
Constitution. According to this Article 49, the Prime Minister can request the National
Assembly to cast a confidence vote, which legally prevents the emergence of a divided
government  in  France  thus  favouring  cohabitation10.  Such  a  confidence  vote,  if
supported by Parliament,  can further legitimise the role of the Prime Minister as a
counterbalance to the power of the President. In other words, in France, the situation
of the President and the Prime Minister holding equal power is strengthened by Article
49. Such a footing can provide an incentive yet also a constraint for the President to
choose cohabitation, rather than a divided government in which the Prime Minister
might fail to gain the confidence vote of Parliament immediately after appointment. In
Taiwan’s system, the absence of this resort to a confidence vote not being prescribed in
the Constitution, means there is no strong incentive to choose cohabitation11.
7 Furthermore, France and Taiwan have in place slightly different mechanisms where the
crucial no-confidence vote, which can break executive-legislative gridlock and initiate
a sprit of responsible politics in the parliamentary system, is concerned12. In Taiwan, if
the  legislature  finds  the  Premier  unacceptable,  its  only  constitutional  option  is  to
undertake a vote of no-confidence in accordance with amendment article 3, which, if it
passes,  opens  the  door  for  the  President  to  passively  dissolve  the   legislature13.
Therefore, under threat of being dissolved by the President, the legislature must think
twice before issuing a vote of no-confidence which will lessen the leverage power of
legislature on the Premier. As the President has the power to appoint or remove the
Premier,  cohabitation  could  be  a  possible  option,  but  is  not  required  by  the
Constitution. 
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1. President and Premier after the 1997 Constitution revision
8 The rule is quite different in France, especially concerning the President’s active right
to dissolve the Parliament. Article 49 Section 2 of Fifth Republic Constitution rules that
the National Assembly can propose a vote of no-confidence with more than a one-tenth
vote of the total Parliament members. Due to the frequent issuing of no-confidence
votes in the Third and Fourth Republics, Article 12 of the Fifth Republic Constitution
grants the President the right to actively dissolve Parliament 14.  This rule may to a
certain extent institutionalise the emergence of cohabitation through the presidential
power if the President dissolves the Parliament and the re-election result of the new
Parliament still forces the President to face an opposition majority15.  
Constitutional practice
9 The purpose of analysing how the Constitution works in practice, of the gap between
the  written  Constitution  and  its  application,  and  of  the  dynamic  interaction  with
psychological, social and cultural traits, is to explore why under a similar constitutional
framework―a semi-presidential system―France has seen cohabitations and Taiwan up
to now has not.  
10 Constitutionally speaking, although the ROC President is granted the right to freely
choose the Premier without the consent of Parliament, the Parliament can indirectly
exert influence in the choice of the Premier via a threat of a vote of no-confidence. This
could trigger a constitutional crisis, and a consequential retaliation by the President in
dissolving  the  Parliament.  If  the  above  is  followed,  the  ROC  President  could  be
constrained in  his  or  her  choice  of  Premier  and,  when facing strong opposition in
Parliament,  have  no  choice  but  to  appoint  an  opposition  Premier  to  lead  the
government, handing the major executive right to the Executive Yuan. However, this
did not happen during 2000-2004, nor has it happened in the 2005 presidency, though
President Chen Shui-bian faces a majority opposition in the Legislative Yuan (Table 2).
Taiwan’s political system is led by a strong President in a divided government.
 
2. Party affiliation of legislators
The unfunctionality of the no-confidence vote
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11 The no-confidence vote mechanism design is originated from the parliamentary system
and  its  purpose  is  maintaining  a  responsible  politic,  balance  of  power  between
government branches and resolving executive-legislative gridlock. However,  the no-
confidence  vote  mechanism  has  never  been  used  in  Taiwan,  for  legislators  are
unwilling to trigger its introduction unless urgently needed. Without a no-confidence
vote, the President can continue with an opposition majority in Parliament: this has
happened several times and appears to be becoming a constitutional routine.
12 What prevents legislators casting a vote of  no-confidence is  rooted in the electoral
system of  the  multi-member  district  with  a  single-non-transferable  vote  (SNTV)  in
which legislators run for re-election at great risk16. In the SNTV, a voter has only one
vote in a multi-member district and the vote is not transferable. Moreover, while each
individual candidate need only obtain enough ballots to pass the threshold of exclusion
to be elected,  intra-party competition might be stiffer than inter-party competition
during elections17. Every candidate must stand out, and closely watch his/her brokers
and loyal  supporters in order to avoid vote erosion18.  So,  if  having been through a
highly  competitive  election  and  having  finally  been  elected  as  legislators,  being
rational actors,  they would not easily cast a vote of no-confidence, which would be
equivalent to giving up their legislative seat and gambling again on the next legislative
re-election19.
13 Moreover, according to a recent survey, the average spend of a legislative candidate
during a single election amounts to NT$42 million20 which makes a no-confidence vote
and the consequential re-election campaign for legislators very expensive and clearly
less  preferable.  Therefore,  without  exercising  a  no-confidence  vote,  a  divided
government called by a Taiwan President can survive without considering cohabitation
as an option21.
Lack of historical path dependence
14 Another  factor  that  may  prevent  the  emergence  of  cohabitation  in  Taiwan  can  be
understood by the lack of any historical experience of any similar system in the past in
Taiwan.
15 Taiwan, heavy with historical  political  experience,  and Taiwan people,  have a great
expectation  of  the  role  of  a  President.  Even  the  operation  of  the  dual-executive—
namely  two  rulers,  the  President  and  the  Premier—,  and  prescribed  in  the  semi-
presidential system of Taiwan, can hardly be accepted, even as a concept22. Taiwan has
had 37 years of a highly centralised interim rule under a strong man and KMT rules, a
period  during  which  the  Constitution,  which  permitted  a  balance  of  power,  was
suspended23. One ruling organ—the President or the KMT—was for a long time the only
source of authority and power for the government. Even after 1996 when President Lee
Teng-hui was directly elected, his ruling style is characterised as “super-presidential”.
Former Premier Chang Chun-hsiung pointed out that “A President who can nominate
the  Premier  without  consent  of  Parliament,  is  not  required  to  be  responsible  for
Parliament, yet has the right to dissolve Parliament, is creating a powerful President
without  responsibility  and  a  powerless  Premier  with  responsibility24.  What  Taiwan
people  expect  from  a  popular  elected  President  exceeds  the  constitutional  right  a
President  can hold.  The idea of  a  second ruler—the Premier  to  counterbalance the
President or to co-rule with the President, has so far hardly found historical support in
the Taiwan community. 
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16 The 1997 ROC Constitution does offer Taiwan a dual-executive and a semi-presidential
framework, yet the gap between the written Constitution and its practice reduces the
likelihood of cohabitation in Taiwan. “Cohabitation”, called for by the Pan-Blue camp,
has  never  been  seen  in  Taiwan,  and  there  is  still  a  way  to  go  before  it  could  be
successfully implemented. The constitutional systems of the ROC and the French Fifth
Republic  are  quite  different.  The  unfunctionality  of  the  no-confidence  vote  due  to
SNTV  electoral  rule  and  the  high  cost  of  winning  the  re-election  are  crucial to
understanding why the rule of a divided government, over cohabitation, persists in
Taiwan. Unlike France, where constitutional customs are already established and the
concept  of  dual-executives  continuously  practiced,  Taiwan  does  not  have  the
experience that could provide a stable base for the establishment if a system that could
embrace cohabitation. 
17 Will Taiwan see cohabitation in the future? Based on the current formal constitutional
arrangement,  cohabitation  may  be  unlikely  to  emerge  in  Taiwan.  If  adding
constitutional  practice,  especially  with  the  evolving  power  structure  within  the
Legislature, President Chen is facing a different political environment than that faced
by Lee Tung-Hui. During his first term, President Chen has tried to negotiate with Wang
Ching-ping, the Speaker of Legislative Yuan, of the KMT opposition party. Under the
current presidency, he has initiated communication with the opposition leader of the
PFP, Soong Chu-yu. To a certain extent, political reality may lessen the strength of the
President. However, if the current constitutional framework remains unchanged, the
emergence of cohabitation is still unlikely in Taiwan’s present context. The practices of
sharing executive rights between two heads is still to be learned in Taiwan.
NOTES
1. Such a concept was initially proposed in the summer of 2001 by the People First
Party (PFP) who seemed to have carefully analysed the political landscape and
concluded that a “cohabitation à la française” was probably inevitable. Yet this was not
what Chen Shui-Bian had in mind. See Berthier Serge, “Who Won the Legislative
Election in Taiwan?”, Asian Affairs, December 2001. Lien Chan, Chairman of the
Kuomintang (KMT), proposed at the 2004 Taipei Roundtable Meeting of December 16th
with representatives from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIC),
that President Chen should respect the new majority in Parliament by forming a new
cabinet and consider nominating an opposition member, Deputy Legislative Speaker
Chiang Pin-kun, as the new Premier. 
2. The 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) has been revised six times. In
the third revision of 1994, the ROC President is to be elected directly by popular vote,
starting from 1996. The fourth revision of 1997 introduced the nomination of the
Premier by the President and the parliamentary vote of no-confidence. 
3. The 2000-2004 and 2005-2008 pan-green Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chen
Shui-bian presidency is facing pan-blue opposition majority in the Parliament. 
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4. As the President is to be elected by a popular vote directly with his/her party, then
often referred to as the ruling party, some people have compared the Taiwanese system
to the US-style presidential system. Lin Chia-chen, former president of the Research,
Development, and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan, offered such
comment in Zhongguo shibao (China Times), on October 1st 2001. President Chen Shui-
bian often used the US President as an example to exert influence in the appointment
of personnel in the Executive Yuan, which showed his intention to pull the system
towards a US-style presidential system. However, countries such as Australia, Ireland,
Singapore and Portugal all directly elect their President, yet none of their systems can
be defined as presidential, and Taiwan does not have a presidential system formally
established by its constitution either.
5. Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government”, 
European Journal of Political Research, No. 2, Vol. 8, June, 1980, p. 166.
6. Maurice Duverger notes that, in countries that are semi-presidential in essence,
there is a diversity of semi-presidential practices. That is why we devote our efforts to
analysing what variables have led to a different operation among similar semi-
presidential systems. Other scholars, such as Shugart & Carey, Presidents and Assemblies:
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (1992), Robert Eligie in Semi-Presidentialism in
Europe (1999), have also discussed different practices of semi-presidentialism around
the world. Robert Eligie has attempted to define the concept of semi-presidentialism
via three approaches. Firstly, semi-presidentialism is said to be a type of democratic
regime where executive power is divided between a President and a Prime Minister but
where the President has substantial powers. It also concerns specific constitutional
arrangements with actual powers as Maurice Duverger has specified. Further, semi-
presidentialism can be simply a type of regime with dispositional properties in which a
popularly-elected, fixed-term President exists alongside a Prime Minister and cabinet
who are responsible to Parliament, regardless of how powerful a president is (“Semi-
presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations”, October
24th-25th 2003, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 4-7).
7. Taiwan is most likely to be included in the third type of semi-presidentialism under
this category elaborated by Eligie.
8. ROC Constitution amendment, Article 2: Presidential orders to appoint or remove
from office the Premier or personnel appointed with the confirmation of the Legislative
Yuan in accordance with the Constitution, and to dissolve the Legislative Yuan, shall
not require the countersignature of the Premier. 
9. Fifth Republic Constitution, Article 8. 
10. The confidence vote requires absolute majority support in the Parliament. Any
coalition of opposition force against the Prime Minister can easily defeat it. During the
first cohabitation, leftist President Mitterrand nominated the rightist Jacques Chirac as
Prime Minister, who, immediately after entering office requested a vote of confidence.
The result was positive with 292 in support and 285 against, strengthening the
leadership of Chirac in the cohabitation and counterbalancing his power with that of
Mitterrand. See Jean-Louis Thiébault, “France: Cabinet Decision-Making under the Fifth
Republic”, in Jean Blondel and F. Muller-Rommel (eds.), Cabinets in Western Europe, New
York, St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 108-109. 
11. Although both the French and Taiwan Constitutions state that the Premier is
responsible before Parliament, in France this often means that the Prime Minister,
although appointed by the President, must represent the parliamentary majority. In
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Taiwan, the Premier might not be expected to represent the parliamentary majority;
his or her role might resemble more the role of the “chief of staff” in the US
presidential system. 
12. This point shows the main gap between the Constitution and constitutional
practice. 
13. Amendment article 3: With the signatures of more than one-third of the total
number of Legislative Yuan members, the Legislative Yuan may propose a no-
confidence vote against the Premier. The Premier shall tender his resignation within
ten days and at the same time may request that the President dissolve the Legislative
Yuan. 
14. Fifth Republic Constitution, Article 12: The President, upon consultation with the
Prime Minister and chairmen of the two chambers, can dissolve the Parliament. 
15. In the complex relationship between the President, the Executive and the
Legislature throughout the French history, there is a constitutional custom worth
mentioning. On June 25th 1877, President Mac-Mahon dissolved Parliament with the
intention of changing the majority composition of the Parliament and nominating a
Prime Minister of his own preference. However, the dissolution of the Parliament
leaded ultimately to the same composition of parties and subsequently to Mac-Mahon’s
resignation. The Mac-Mahon case created a constitutional routine for France: “if not
accepting the majority in Parliament, a President shall then resign”. Such
constitutional routine cannot be found in Taiwan, reducing the likelihood of
cohabitation.
16. The current term for a legislator is three years, which may also influence cost
considerations. Yet, this might not be the main reason which results in unfunctionality
of the no-confidence vote. Worth mentioning is that in a near future with the new
electoral rule for the next term legislative election, namely a four-year term and the
single member district method, the cost of re-election might face more uncertainty. 
17. Gary W. Cox and Frances Rosenbluth, “The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions
in Japan”, American Political Science Review, No. 87, 1993, p. 579. 
18. Wang Yeh-lih, “The Political Consequences of the Electoral System: Single Non
Transferable Voting in Taiwan”, Issues & Studies, August 1996. p. 96. Wang also points
out that under SNTV, party identification is less important unless there is only one
candidate in the district. More emphasis has been made on individual candidates when
a party has many candidates competing in the same district.
19. See Yang James Jih-Ching, “Effects of Constitutional Amendment and Party
Reorganization on Constitutional Framework”, Theory and Policy, July 2000, Vol. 54, pp.
199-218 (in Chinese).
20. Melody Chen, “Social alliance pushes for two vote election system”, Taipei Times,
August 19th 2003. In this report, Chien Hsi-chieh, a DPP lawmaker and executive
director of the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan, cited a recent survey that revealed the
average cost a legislative candidate has to spend during a single election amounts to
NT$42 million”. A legislator's pay during his or her term totals, at most, NT$20 million,
Chien said.
21. Despite the fact that the no-confidence vote in Taiwan has never been used,
President Chen, after experiencing much legislative gridlock, has begun to consult the
opinions of the opposition party in the Legislative Yuan. The recent 10 points
consensus reached by Chen Shui-bian and Soong Chu-yu exemplifies such an attempt.
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Therefore, whether a no-confidence vote will be triggered and effect a lessening of the
power of the President remains uncertain and requires further observation. 
22. A popular Chinese saying goes, “No two suns in the sky, no two rulers for a nation”. 
23. From 1949 when the KMT government moved to Taiwan, until 1987, due to martial
law, the Constitution did not operate. 
24. Chang Chun-hsiung, “Can we only expect ‘charisma’ without making any mistakes?
Revise the Constitution but watch out for the turbulence that may result”, Lianhe bao
(United Daily News), May 13th 1997, p. 15.
RÉSUMÉS
After the Legislative Yuan elections in December 2004, Taiwan’s political arena was, once again,
echoing with recurring calls for French-style political cohabitation. Despite the similarity with
the French constitutional system, the two systems differ in the gap between what is written in
the Constitution in Taiwan and what is practiced. Why did cohabitation not occur in Taiwan?
What has prevented cohabitation since President Chen Shui-bian’s election victory in 2000? This
article sets out to analyse the above questions by comparing the ways in which Taiwan drafts its
constitutional rules with those used in France. And special attention is paid to the gap between
constitutional norms and principles and the application of the constitution in practice.
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